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Essay 
TAXING ENDOWMENT 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK† 
INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1888, Francis A. Walker, the first president of the 
American Economic Association, claimed that the ideal tax base was 
neither wealth, nor income, nor consumption, but rather “faculty, or 
native or acquired power of production.”1 According to Walker, only 
this tax base—what people could earn, rather than the often lesser 
amounts they actually earn—could achieve an equitable distribution 
of the tax burden: 
We must, I think, conclude that . . . to tax revenue instead of faculty 
is to put a premium upon self-indulgence in the form of indolence, 
the waste of opportunities, the abuse of natural powers; and that a 
faculty tax constitutes the only theoretically just form of taxation, 
men being required to serve the state in the degree in which they 
have ability to serve themselves.2 
Although he conceded that practical difficulties made adoption of a 
pristine faculty tax impossible, he urged that it should nevertheless be 
“held in view, as furnishing the line from which to measure all 
departures from the equities of contribution, as one or another form 
of taxation . . . comes to be adopted for meeting the wants of 
government.”3 
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 1. Francis A. Walker, The Bases of Taxation, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 14 (1888). 
 2. Id. at 15. 
 3. Id. at 16. 
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Writing almost a century later, the economist David Bradford 
reached a similar conclusion.4 According to Bradford, tax burdens 
should be sensitive to differences in people’s opportunities, but not 
sensitive to the different choices they might make. Ideally, each 
person would be subject to a one-time tax, at the beginning of his 
working years, on the present value of “his initial endowment of 
financial wealth and of future earning power.”5 A tax imposed 
annually rather than once in a lifetime could approximate the effects 
of the single tax, if (1) financial wealth was subject to a consumption 
tax rather than an income tax,6 and (2) people were taxed on each 
year’s potential labor earnings, rather than on their actual labor 
earnings.7 For Bradford, the practical policy significance of the 
endowment tax ideal related to the first point—that a consumption 
tax was superior to an income tax because it more closely approached 
the endowment ideal.8 As a theoretical matter, however, he also 
insisted on the desirability of taxing potential earnings. In support of 
his claim, he posited a professional football quarterback and an 
individual without any high wage skills. Ideally the quarterback 
should be taxed more heavily than the nonathlete, because of his 
better opportunities, even if the nonathlete actually earns more 
money: 
It might be that the nonathlete works very hard at a menial job and 
manages to earn more than the athlete, who chooses to work only 
on Saturday [sic] afternoons. If the athlete has the option of doing 
the same thing as the nonathlete but in addition has the opportunity 
to earn a high reward as a quarterback, the fact that he chooses to 
use the better opportunity in part to enjoy more leisure does not 
 
 4. DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC 
TAX REFORM 36 (2d ed. 1984). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 36–38; DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 162–66 (1986). 
 7. BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 154–56. 
 8. “A consumption tax amounts to a tax on lifetime endowment. . . . An income tax will 
tend to assess tax burdens in a way presumably correlated with lifetime wealth, but because it 
depends upon matters of timing, the correspondence is nowhere near as close as . . . under a 
consumption base tax.” BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, supra note 4, at 39. 
If two people begin life with the same financial wealth, but one consumes the wealth 
immediately, while the other saves and invests it to finance greater future consumption, an 
annual consumption tax will mirror the effects of a one-time tax on financial endowment, in that 
both the consumption tax and the endowment tax will impose equal burdens on the two persons 
(in present value terms). By contrast, an income tax will impose a heavier burden on the saver. 
BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 163. 
02__ZELENAK.DOC 10/13/2006  8:49 AM 
2006] TAXING ENDOWMENT 1147 
alter the conclusion that his opportunities are better or the 
theoretical case for assigning him the larger burden.9 
Generalizing the point, Bradford explained, “What one might like to 
have is a tax based on an individual’s potential earnings: the 
individual’s tax would then be unrelated to his choice of what to do.”10 
Only the unfortunate inability of the tax administrator to observe 
potential earnings dissuaded Bradford from actually advocating such 
a tax.11 
Despite the longstanding and understandable lack of 
congressional interest in taxing unexercised earning capacity, the idea 
of endowment taxation—in the sense of a tax based on potential 
rather than actual earnings—has attracted increasing attention in 
recent years from economists, philosophers, and academic tax 
lawyers. The dialogue among academic tax lawyers is especially lively 
at the moment, with important recent contributions by Daniel 
Shaviro,12 Kirk Stark,13 and David Hasen.14 With endowment taxation 
being addressed from several disciplinary frameworks, and with most 
contributions focusing on only one or a few aspects of the topic,15 it is 
not easy for a reader to grasp all the scholarly threads relevant to 
endowment tax analysis. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
some recent articles with important implications for endowment 
taxation have not been identified by their authors as contributions to 
the endowment tax literature,16 and so have gone unnoticed by those 
who are explicitly pondering endowment taxation. 
 
 9. BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 154. 
 10. Id. at 156. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 
123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002). 
 13. Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objection to 
Endowment Taxation, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 47 (2005). 
 14. David Hasen, The Illiberality of Human Endowment Taxation (Aug. 10, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=779545 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006)). 
 15. The discussion in Shaviro, supra note 12, is perhaps the widest ranging in the literature. 
At least five significant contributions to the literature postdate Shaviro’s work, however, and 
thus are not considered by him. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF 
OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing 
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003); Daniel 
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291 (2003); Stark, 
supra note 13; Hasen, supra note 14. 
 16. E.g., Terrence Chorvat, Taxing Utility, 35 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1 (2006); Logue & Avraham, 
supra note 15; Markovits, supra note 15. 
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The aim of this review Essay is to provide a reasonably 
comprehensive critical guide to the state of the endowment tax 
discussion. Because the utilitarian arguments for and against 
endowment taxation are quite different from the liberal egalitarian 
arguments, this Essay considers the merits of endowment taxation 
from both perspectives. Part I explains that an endowment tax base 
has no inherent normative significance for a utilitarian—that is, 
endowment is not necessarily the very thing a utilitarian would want 
to tax in an ideal world. On the other hand, if it were practical to 
measure endowment, a utilitarian might support an endowment tax 
out of a belief that it would produce a higher sum of individuals’ 
utilities than any other tax system (because it could accomplish 
utility-enhancing redistribution with minimal inefficiency costs). 
Finally, however, the strange distributional effects of a utility-
maximizing endowment tax—the fact that after-tax utility is inversely 
related to ability in such a system—may cause some to reconsider 
their philosophical commitment to utilitarianism. 
Part II considers the liberal egalitarian responses to endowment 
taxation. It is considerably longer than Part I, because the liberal 
egalitarian analysis of endowment taxation is (frankly) more 
interesting than the utilitarian analysis, and because the scholarly 
development of the liberal egalitarian concerns has been more 
extensive than the development of the utilitarian concerns. In 
general, liberal egalitarians would find an endowment tax attractive 
for reasons congenial to Walker and Bradford—because of its 
potential for redistributing on the basis of differences in brute luck 
without also redistributing on the basis of differences in choices—but 
for the risk of talent slavery posed by endowment taxation. The talent 
slavery concern is that a person who could earn a very high wage, but 
only by working full time at a job he despises, may be forced into that 
hated employment by the need to pay the tax. After evaluating the 
merits of the talent slavery objection, this Essay considers various 
ways an endowment tax might be circumscribed or the definition of 
endowment might be revised, so that the threat of talent slavery 
would be reduced or eliminated. In the process, this Essay examines 
ways in which a narrow focus on potential earnings may disregard 
important differences in the true endowments (or net brute luck) of 
different persons. Finally, Part II describes and evaluates the claim 
that the basic premise of endowment taxation is “distinctly illiberal,” 
entirely apart from concerns about talent slavery. 
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Part III turns to some practical implications of endowment tax 
theory. Endowment taxation—perhaps with endowment not defined 
solely on the basis of potential earnings—would have much to 
commend it, if the problems of measurement and talent slavery could 
be overcome. The question thus arises whether some modest steps 
could and should be taken in the direction of endowment taxation—
slouching toward an endowment tax—if those steps would not 
implicate either of the problems associated with a full-fledged 
endowment tax. This Essay describes and evaluates several proposals 
for partial implementation of endowment taxation. It also suggests 
that several aspects of current law—both within and outside the 
Internal Revenue Code—can plausibly be viewed as instances of 
limited endowment taxation. This Essay concludes that, although 
Congress will not and should not enact a full-fledged endowment tax, 
endowment tax principles can usefully inform tax policy analyses, 
especially if the concept of endowment is broadened from the usual 
narrow focus on earnings potential. 
I.  UTILITARIANISM AND ENDOWMENT TAXATION 
A classic utilitarian’s goal in designing a tax-and-transfer system 
is to maximize the sum of individuals’ utilities. If the base of the tax is 
to be income, the crucial question is how best to balance the utility 
gains from redistribution of income from higher-income to lower-
income persons (on the assumption that income has declining 
marginal utility) against the utility losses from the substitution effects 
of the tax.17 Substitution effects result when taxpayers change their 
behavior to avoid a tax, substituting untaxed (or less heavily taxed) 
behavior for the taxed behavior. Suppose, for example, that a 
taxpayer’s wage rate is $100 per hour, that his marginal income tax 
rate is 30 percent, that he values leisure time (at the margin) at $80 
per hour, and that he is deciding whether to spend the next hour 
working or at leisure. In the absence of tax, he would choose to work, 
because he values his leisure at less than his $100 wage rate. In the 
 
 17. How to achieve this goal, under various assumed conditions, is the subject of optimal 
income tax analysis. See generally MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND 
REDISTRIBUTION (1990) (a comprehensive monograph on optimal income taxation); J.A. 
Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 
(1971) (the seminal work in the field); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the 
Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 51–62 (1999) (a 
nontechnical introduction to optimal income tax analysis). 
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presence of the income tax, however, he will choose $80 of untaxed 
leisure over $70 of after-tax income. He views the $30 tax that would 
be imposed on his work as a positive externality—a benefit to society 
but not to him, which he disregards in making his labor supply 
decision. The result of the substitution effect in this example is a 
deadweight loss of $20—the difference between the $100 value of his 
work and the $80 value of his leisure. 
If it were possible to replace the income tax with a tax on 
potential earnings—that is, an endowment tax—the utility gains from 
redistribution could be achieved without the deadweight loss 
associated with an income tax. The taxpayer would have no tax 
incentive to substitute leisure for labor because his tax liability would 
be unaffected by the amount he actually earns.18 A head tax—a tax 
imposed in an equal dollar amount on each person—would also avoid 
the deadweight loss of the substitution effect, but it could not achieve 
the utility gains from redistribution possible with an endowment tax. 
At first glance, then, it seems that an endowment tax would be the 
choice of a utilitarian, if the tax administrator is able to observe 
potential wage rates. Upon closer examination, however, the 
utilitarian case for an endowment tax becomes shaky, even on the 
heroic assumption that potential earnings are observable. 
First, the conventional wisdom that head taxes and endowment 
taxes have no substitution effects may not be quite right. In a recent 
article, Terrence Chorvat claims that the fact that head taxes and 
endowment taxes must be paid in cash means the taxes are less than 
perfectly efficient: “While lump-sum taxes are commonly argued to 
be perfectly non-distortive, we can see that such taxes can distort 
relative prices between monetary and non-monetary goods, due to 
[their] requirement that [they] be paid in money. Therefore, even a 
lump-sum tax has deadweight loss.”19 To make the point more 
concrete, suppose a particular person with a high wage rate would 
choose, in the absence of any tax, to spend all his time as a 
beachcomber—because he hates the work that would produce the 
high wage, because he loves beachcombing, or both. If he is subject to 
a high endowment tax based on his potential earnings, and if he can 
earn the high wage only by working full time (i.e., the labor market is 
very “lumpy” in his case), then he has two choices: he can work full 
 
 18. For statements that an endowment tax has no substitution effect, and therefore no 
deadweight loss, see Stark, supra note 13, at 54, and Hasen, supra note 14, at 8. 
 19. Chorvat, supra note 16, at 6. 
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time at the hated job and pay the tax in cash, or he can decline to 
work and be imprisoned. The latter choice can be viewed as an in-
kind tax, equal to 100 percent of his time, if he insists on not fully 
exploiting his earning potential. If, faced with these choices, he 
understandably chooses to work at the hated job, the change in 
behavior can be understood as a substitution effect of the in-kind tax, 
with resultant deadweight loss. As in standard accounts of 
substitution effects, he has changed his behavior to avoid the heavy 
tax imposed on refusing to work.20 Although this means that an 
endowment tax does not achieve efficiency nirvana, the substitution 
effects of an endowment tax are certainly less significant than those of 
an income tax. Thus endowment taxation should continue to be 
attractive to utilitarians as far as deadweight loss is concerned. 
The next question for a utilitarian pondering an endowment tax 
is whether transfers of cash from persons with higher potential 
earnings to those with lower potential earnings are necessarily utility 
enhancing (setting aside questions of deadweight loss). In the context 
of an income tax, utilitarians are generally willing to make the 
assumptions about interpersonal comparisons of utility necessary to 
conclude that taking money from a person with more income and 
transferring it to a person with less income benefits the lower-income 
person more than it hurts the higher-income person. Is it also 
reasonable to conclude that redistribution of cash based on earnings 
potential improves overall utility, because a person with higher 
potential earnings has a lower marginal utility of cash than does a 
person with lower potential earnings? That conclusion would be 
reasonable, if having a higher wage rate is associated with having 
higher earned income.21 On the other hand, if people differ in respects 
other than their wage rates—in particular if they differ with respect to 
their degree of work aversion (disutility of labor) or materialism 
(utility derived from purchased consumption), or both—then taking 
money from those with higher wage rates to finance transfers to those 
with lower wage rates does not necessarily increase the sum of 
 
 20. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1919–21 (1987) (explaining the 
substitution effect of an income tax, which is a “change in the willingness of individuals to 
sacrifice leisure for consumption”). 
 21. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 137 (arguing that redistribution on the basis of 
endowment is utility enhancing, assuming a higher wage rate results in higher earnings); Stark, 
supra note 13, at 54 (same). 
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individuals’ utilities.22 Imposing a heavy endowment tax on a person 
who can earn a high wage only by working at a job he hates may 
cause a massive utility loss for that person, especially if the labor 
market is lumpy (so that he must work full time at the high-wage job 
or not at all).23 This is the talent slavery scenario, which is at the heart 
of most liberal egalitarians’ objections to endowment taxation.24 The 
common liberal egalitarian response is to reject an endowment tax if 
it would result in talent slavery of even one person, regardless of how 
attractive the tax might be in all other respects. A utilitarian, by 
contrast, might be willing to accept a system producing talent slavery 
for a few persons, if their utility losses were outweighed by the utility 
gains the system produced for others.25 
In sum, the utilitarian view of endowment taxation is rather 
complicated. An endowment tax would be the utilitarian ideal if 
people were identical in all respects other than their earnings 
capacities. On the other hand, as Daniel Shaviro remarks, utilitarians 
would find “no clear justification for imposing a straightforward 
endowment tax, even if we could measure endowment. . . . once we 
allow for taste differences and lumpy labor markets.”26 Finally, if 
endowments were measurable but other differences (in work aversion 
and materialism) were not, a utilitarian might conclude that the net 
effects of an endowment tax—redistribution of cash mostly in utility-
enhancing directions, with much less deadweight loss than an income 
tax—were superior to the results achievable under any other tax 
system.27 
It may be, however, that when push comes to shove there are few 
utilitarians. Several decades ago, James Mirrlees considered the 
design of the utility-maximizing endowment tax-and-transfer system, 
assuming the tax administrator could observe wage rates and that 
 
 22. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 137–40 (noting that the results may change if one takes 
these individual preferences into account); Stark, supra note 13, at 54–55 (same). 
 23. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 138. 
 24. On the talent slavery concerns of liberal egalitarians, see infra text accompanying notes 
33–43. 
 25. The willingness of utilitarians to make tradeoffs of this sort is the object of John 
Rawls’s criticism that utilitarianism “does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971). 
 26. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 139. 
 27. Shaviro and Stark reach similar conclusions. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 140 
(concluding that endowment is a better tool for measuring inequality than the “proxy 
standards” of income, consumption, or wealth); Stark, supra note 13, at 54–55 (concluding that 
endowment taxation could redistribute cash in utility-enhancing directions). 
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people differed in their wage rates but were identical in all other 
respects. He demonstrated that the optimal system would leave each 
member of society with the same number of after-tax-and-transfer 
dollars (and thus with the same amount of purchased consumption), 
but that higher-wage persons would work more hours than others.28 
The results can be explained intuitively. First, redistribution of cash 
(and so of consumption opportunities) should continue until utility 
gains from further redistribution are not possible, and that point will 
be reached only when marginal utilities of cash have been equalized 
across the population by equalizing after-tax-and-transfer cash 
receipts. Second, for any given amount of foregone leisure, the work 
of the more able produces more value—and hence more consumption 
opportunities translatable into utility—than does the work of the less 
able; it follows that utility is promoted if the more able work more 
hours than the less able. Under this utility-maximizing endowment 
tax, persons of higher ability are worse off than persons of lower 
ability. Each person’s total utility is the sum of his utility from 
consumption and his utility from leisure. Higher wage persons have 
the same consumption as lower wage persons while having less 
leisure, and so have lower total utility. To a thoroughgoing utilitarian 
there is nothing wrong with that result, since it produces a higher sum 
of individuals’ utilities than any other possible system. Few people 
may remain utilitarians, however, if that requires accepting the 
conclusion that the ideal tax-and-transfer system would make the 
most talented members of society the least well-off. 
II.  LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM AND ENDOWMENT TAXATION 
This Part considers the prima facie liberal egalitarian case for 
endowment taxation, the “talent slavery” objection to endowment 
taxation, and the possibility of designing an endowment tax so as to 
avoid talent slavery. Talent slavery might be avoided by limiting the 
redistributive ambition of the tax. It might also, and perhaps more 
interestingly, be avoided by the use of more nuanced concepts of 
endowment, focused on welfare rather than potential earnings, and 
taking into account the disutility of work. Finally, this Part considers a 
claim that endowment taxation is fundamentally “illiberal,” even 
when talent slavery is not an issue. 
 
 28. Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 201. 
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A. The Prima Facie Case for Endowment Taxation 
Although there is great diversity in liberal egalitarian theories of 
distributive justice, the moral distinction between people’s “brute 
luck” and the results of people’s choices is central to most liberal 
egalitarians.29 Brute luck—including the distribution of abilities in the 
natural lottery—is morally arbitrary. People do not deserve their 
brute luck, either good or bad, and so the government should act to 
ameliorate the disadvantages of those who have suffered from bad 
brute luck. Once there has been appropriate redistribution with 
respect to brute luck, however, the government should be neutral 
with respect to the free choices made by different individuals 
pursuing different visions of the good life. Thus the government 
should not redistribute among people who, faced with the same 
opportunities, make different choices and experience different 
outcomes. 
Although people do, of course, differ in their endowments of 
financial wealth, the most significant differences in brute luck are 
differences in human endowments—that is, differences in abilities 
based on the morally arbitrary distribution of genetic inheritances 
and the benefits of parental care and attention. Also morally arbitrary 
are the differing rewards the economy happens to confer on people 
possessing different skills. If some people are endowed with great 
earnings potential and others are not, the egalitarian urge to lessen or 
eliminate the effect of brute luck would suggest redistribution from 
those with above-average ability (i.e., earnings potential) to those 
with below-average ability; and since ability cannot be redistributed 
in kind,30 the redistribution might take the form of cash transfers to 
 
 29. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 119 (describing “equal libertarianism” 
as calling for redistribution to the extent necessary to produce “equality of opportunity in a 
market economy”); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 916 
(1989) (arguing that egalitarianism calls for the elimination of “involuntary disadvantage,” but 
not for the elimination of the consequences of different individuals’ different choices); Ronald 
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292–95 
(1981) (distinguishing between “brute luck” and “option luck,” and suggesting that 
redistribution with respect to the former is appropriate while redistribution with respect to the 
latter is not); Markovits, supra note 15, at 2300 (labeling this view “responsibility-tracking 
egalitarianism”); Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 285 
(2000) (“Liberal egalitarians like myself believe that justice asks a good deal of beneficiaries of 
[brute] luck . . . .”). 
 30. That is, one person’s innate ability cannot be taken from that person and given to 
another person. On the possibility of an endowment tax payable in labor rather than in dollars, 
see infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
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the less able financed by taxes (payable, of course, in cash) on the 
endowments of the more able. If we want to redistribute with respect 
to endowment, then the ideal base for the tax to finance the 
redistribution is necessarily endowment.31 
In theory, such a tax might be designed as either a one-time 
tax—imposed perhaps at birth or upon reaching the age of 18 or 21—
on the present value of one’s lifetime earnings potential, or as an 
annual tax on the maximum wages one could have earned in the 
current year. Under certain stylized assumptions (most notably, a 
single tax rate and the absence of any uncertainty about one’s lifetime 
earnings potential), the two approaches are economically equivalent. 
To avoid piling the impracticalities any higher than necessary, the 
remainder of this discussion will assume the endowment tax under 
consideration is of the annual variety. Imagine, then, two people who 
have the same high earnings potential for the current year, but who 
have made different choices—one to work at the highest available 
wage for as many hours as humanly possible, the other to earn much 
less by working at a more pleasant (or less unpleasant) lower wage 
job, by working fewer hours, or both. A liberal egalitarian might 
conclude that they should bear the same tax burden (to finance 
redistribution to those of lower ability), despite their very different 
cash incomes, since they had the same opportunities. If taxation is to 
be sensitive to the distribution of brute luck, but insensitive to 
differences resulting from different people making different choices, 
then the tax system should not treat these two equally able persons 
differently merely because one chose to work at a higher wage rate 
(at a less pleasant job) or to work more hours. 
In short, the prima facie liberal egalitarian case for a tax on 
potential earnings, rather than on actual wages, is strong. 
Nevertheless, liberal egalitarians generally end by rejecting 
endowment taxation.32 The reasons for this rejection are described 
and evaluated below. 
 
 31. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 123 (“If we want to redistribute ‘income,’ then of course 
[income] is the right thing to tax . . . .”). 
 32. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 121–25 (concluding that “[t]he principal 
ethical objection to endowment taxation [is that] it would constitute a . . . radical interference 
with autonomy” and therefore “it would not be a serious option”); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 158 (2001) (rejecting an endowment tax because it “would violate 
our basic liberties”); Rakowski, supra note 29, at 267 n.10 (noting that “[v]irtually nobody” 
advocates a tax based directly on a person’s abilities). 
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B. The Talent Slavery Objection 
1. The Objection.  The most prominent liberal egalitarian 
objection to endowment taxation is that it would inevitably result in 
“slavery of the talented.”33 Imagine a person with one skill very highly 
valued by the economy who could earn $10 million in one year by 
fully exploiting that skill. Suppose also that the market for that skill is 
as lumpy as possible—i.e., he must either exploit that skill fully or not 
at all—and that his next highest potential wage (doing a very different 
sort of work) is $100,000. If he is taxed on his $10 million earnings 
potential, at a rate of, say, 20 percent, he will owe $2 million tax. The 
only way he can generate the money with which to pay the tax is to 
spend the entire year working at his maximum earnings potential. 
That is fine if he is happy (or even merely not unhappy) with that 
work, but if he happens to hate the work the result is the slavery of 
the talented. On pain of being consigned to debtors’ prison or exile or 
perhaps the wilderness, he must spend the entire year doing work he 
detests. As much as liberal egalitarians value equality of opportunity, 
they also value autonomy, and many of them have concluded that the 
interference with the autonomy of the talented produced by 
endowment taxation is simply unacceptable.34 With the recent and 
important exception of Daniel Markovits (whose views are discussed 
below),35 the liberal egalitarians who have objected to endowment 
taxation on grounds of talent slavery have done so quite summarily; 
the objection has seemed so apparent and so conclusive as to require 
little discussion. 
Recently, however, several commentators have scrutinized the 
talent slavery objection and found it wanting. The most detailed and 
 
 33. For an early use of talent slavery terminology in this context, see Dworkin, supra note 
29, at 312, 322. The fullest and most thoughtful discussion of the taxation of earnings potential 
and talent slavery is in Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13. 
 34. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123 (“[T]he problem is not so much that 
endowment taxation forces people to do what they would prefer not to do, but that it may leave 
people with literally one option in life.”); RAWLS, supra note 32, at 158 (concluding that an 
endowment tax—which Rawls, somewhat confusingly, refers to as a “head tax”—”would force 
the more able into those occupations in which earnings were high enough for them to pay off 
the tax in the required period of time; it would interfere with their liberty to conduct their life 
within the scope of the principles of justice”); Rakowski, supra note 29, at 267 n.10 (“[Taxing 
people on the value of unexploited earnings potential] would effectively enslave the able, by 
forcing them to put their highly taxed talents to some lucrative employ, on pain of sitting in a 
debtors’ prison, however unpalatable the person found richly compensated work”). 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 45–53. 
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most unequivocal rejection of the objection has come from Kirk 
Stark.36 Professor Stark begins with Robert Nozick’s well-known 
libertarian objection to the taxation of wages actually earned, as 
“forcing the [taxed] person to work n hours for another’s purpose,” 
and as therefore “on a par with forced labor.”37 Stark notes that 
Professor Nozick’s involuntary servitude objection to income taxation 
bears a marked resemblance to the liberal egalitarians’ talent slavery 
objection to endowment taxation. In fact, he claims that “there is no 
difference in kind or in degree between the interference with liberty 
occasioned by the two types of taxes,” and that liberal egalitarians 
must either accept Nozick’s critique of income taxation or “embrace 
endowment taxes as a moral ideal.”38 
Professor Stark makes his argument with the aid of a 
hypothetical, based on a similar example offered by Professors 
Murphy and Nagel, involving a sculptor subject to an endowment tax 
and a corporate lawyer subject to an income tax.39 Each could 
potentially earn $500,000 annually by practicing corporate law. The 
sculptor would prefer to spend all his time sculpting pieces he will not 
sell. The corporate lawyer would prefer to spend all his time 
practicing law, in order to earn enough to buy a $500,000 painting he 
covets. If the sculptor is subject to a 20 percent endowment tax (on 
$500,000 of potential earnings), and the corporate lawyer is subject to 
a 20 percent income tax (on $500,000 of actual earnings), they will 
 
 36. Stark, supra note 13. Daniel Shaviro has also suggested that the concern about talent 
slavery may be overstated. Professor Shaviro notes that the current tax system penalizes the 
decision to work for a wage, by taxing wages while not taxing leisure or imputed income from 
services, but that liberal egalitarians do not view this inducement not to work as violating any 
fundamental liberty interest. He suggests that liberal egalitarians who are unconcerned about 
the inducement not to work produced by current law should not be so concerned about the 
compulsion to work produced by an endowment tax: “Although compulsion is merely a strong 
version of inducement (suggesting that they differ only in degree, not in kind), the inclination 
[among liberal egalitarians] to put them in separate categories is apparently strong.” Shaviro, 
supra note 12, at 143. Shaviro is perhaps insufficiently sensitive to the possibility that at some 
point a difference in degree may become a difference in kind. As Murphy and Nagel remark, 
being forced to work full time at a particular occupation (because only by so doing can one 
generate enough cash to pay one’s endowment tax liability) is an “extreme interference with 
autonomy,” which has no counterpart under a tax imposed only on income actually earned. 
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123. 
 37. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169 (1974), quoted in Stark, supra 
note 13, at 48. 
 38. Stark, supra note 13, at 49. 
 39. Id. at 59. For the original version of the hypothetical, see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra 
note 15, at 123. 
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be—according to Stark—equally burdened.40 True, the sculptor will 
have to spend 20 percent of his time practicing corporate law to 
generate the $100,000 necessary to satisfy his tax obligation, but the 
corporate lawyer will be similarly burdened by being able to buy only 
a $400,000 painting. Each loses 20 percent of his preferred 
consumption bundle—the sculptor by losing 20 percent of his desired 
time to sculpt, and the lawyer by losing 20 percent of the desired 
value of his art acquisition. Stark concludes that there is no difference 
in kind or in degree between the impact of the endowment tax on the 
liberty of the sculptor and the impact of the income tax on the liberty 
of the lawyer.41 To Stark, if it is acceptable for the income tax to 
commandeer the value of 20 percent of the lawyer’s time, it should 
also be acceptable for an endowment tax to commandeer the value of 
20 percent of the sculptor’s time. 
Professor Stark mentions—but only in a footnote—that his 
analysis is based on the assumption that the sculptor could earn 
$100,000 by spending 20 percent of his time practicing law. He 
concedes, “If labor markets are ‘lumpy’ and a particular wage rate 
can only be achieved by working full-time, then the analysis may be 
different.”42 If labor markets were completely nonlumpy, as Stark 
supposes in his example, his conclusion would have considerable 
appeal. It is not easy to view as the moral equivalent of slavery an 
endowment tax that leaves the sculptor free to spend 80 percent of his 
time sculpting. In such a world, the talent slavery objection would 
lose most of its force, although a narrow “conscientious objector” 
exception might still be needed for taxpayers who honestly 
considered the best-paying use of their time to be not merely 
unpleasant, but immoral (a view some sculptors might hold of 
corporate law practice). One might also object that even in a world of 
nonlumpy labor supply Stark’s endowment tax on the sculptor seems 
acceptable only because of its relatively low rate; a tax at the rate of 
50 percent, requiring the sculptor to spend half his time practicing 
law, is instinctively much more troubling. Stark could reply, however, 
that his assumed rate is reasonable, because a 20 percent endowment 
tax might raise as much revenue as the current income tax (or even 
more), given its considerably larger base. 
 
 40. Stark, supra note 13, at 59. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 59 n.64. 
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In their original version of the sculptor-and-lawyer hypothetical, 
Professors Murphy and Nagel implicitly make the opposite 
assumption about labor supply lumpiness: “[A] trained corporate 
lawyer taxed according to $500,000 in potential annual earnings will 
find that the time for sculpture is reduced almost to zero.”43 They are 
obviously assuming that the only way he can earn $100,000 is by 
working full time and earning $500,000; if they supposed he could 
satisfy his tax obligation with 20 percent of his time they would not 
claim he would have “almost zero” time left for sculpting. Thus, the 
disagreement about the talent slavery implications of an endowment 
tax appears to be based not on any difference of principle, but on 
different assumptions about the extent to which highly talented 
persons can exploit their talents in the market on a part-time basis. 
Certainly Professor Stark could point to a few situations in which 
labor markets approach the perfect nonlumpiness he assumes: if Tom 
Cruise wants to devote most of his time to sculpting he could satisfy 
his tax obligation by spending ten weeks each year making one movie. 
It seems, though, that similar options are not available for highly 
talented people in most other professions. If the extreme lumpiness 
assumption of Murphy and Nagel is much closer to the real world 
than the no lumpiness assumption of Stark, then Murphy and Nagel 
have the better of the argument. If the endowment tax forces the 
would-be sculptor to spend all of his time practicing corporate law, 
that interference with his liberty is of a higher order of magnitude 
than the income tax forcing the corporate lawyer to make do with a 
$400,000 painting. 
2. Designing an Endowment Tax that Avoids Talent Slavery.  As 
this discussion of the disagreement between Stark and Murphy and 
Nagel suggests, the liberal egalitarian talent slavery objection is not a 
fundamental objection to endowment taxation. If the labor market 
were not lumpy, an endowment tax would not imply talent slavery. 
Even assuming lumpiness in the labor market, liberal egalitarians 
might accept—or even embrace—an endowment tax modified as 
necessary to avoid talent slavery. One such modification has been 
suggested—as an aside—by Louis Kaplow. Professor Kaplow notes 
that “an ability tax with an upper limit of 90 percent of wages or 
income actually earned would almost completely achieve the ability 
 
 43. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123. 
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tax result without literally violating the forced-labor constraint.”44 He 
is certainly right that this hybrid endowment-income tax would not 
raise any talent slavery concerns greater than those raised by a simple 
income tax with a 90 percent top rate, and one supposes that most 
liberal egalitarians would not view high rates under an income tax as 
constituting talent slavery. Kaplow is on weaker ground, however, 
when he claims that the hybrid tax would produce results closely 
resembling a pure endowment tax. If taxpayers like the one described 
earlier (with $10 million of potential earnings in one field but only 
$100,000 actual earnings in a different field) really exist, a $90,000 tax 
on $100,000 wages actually earned would not “almost completely 
achieve the ability tax result” of a $2 million tax on $10 million of 
potential earnings. In some cases, then, the hybrid tax is likely to be 
much more of an income tax, and much less of an endowment tax, 
than Kaplow supposes. 
The most thorough consideration of how an endowment tax 
might be designed to avoid talent slavery comes from Daniel 
Markovits.45 His analysis begins by supposing that people know the 
distribution of wage rates in their society, but that no one knows his 
own particular wage rate.46 (People know their own skills, but they do 
not know the wage rate those skills will command in the market.) In 
this imagined original position, people might plausibly agree to a tax-
and-transfer system as a form of insurance against having been 
unlucky in the talent lottery. If a low wage rate is the risk to be 
insured against, the obvious policy tool would be an endowment 
tax—a tax on the highly talented to finance cash transfers to the less 
talented.47 The question then becomes how much insurance people 
would agree to in the imagined original position. Professor Markovits 
argues convincingly that people would not agree to the highest 
possible level of insurance, under which a person with a below-
average wage rate would receive a cash transfer equal to the excess of 
the average (mean) annual wage for full-time work over his own 
 
 44. Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477, 1506 
n.71 (1994). 
 45. Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13. 
 46. Id. at 2306. 
 47. Professor Markovits borrows from Professor Dworkin, Dworkin, supra note 29, at 323–
34, the model of endowment tax as insurance against the risk of having a low wage rate. 
Markovits’s development of the model, however, is considerably more thorough and thoughtful 
than Dworkin’s. 
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potential earnings.48 The transfers required under that system could 
be made only if each person with above-average earnings potential 
worked full time at his highest possible wage rate, with all wages in 
excess of the average being taxed at the rate of 100 percent for 
transfer to those with below-average skills. But this would result in 
talent slavery not just for a highly talented few, but for everyone with 
an above-average maximum wage rate: “[S]he must always work flat 
out and only at that job which, given her talents, pays most. She 
would be forced to work at this job, and this job only, even if she 
hated the work involved . . . .”49 No one in the original position would 
agree to the level of insurance needed to eliminate the effect of brute 
luck on the distribution of wage rates, when such insurance 
necessarily imposes a high risk of talent slavery.50 
That much is clear, but a harder question remains: At what lower 
level of wage-rate insurance, and associated endowment taxation, 
would the risk of talent slavery be removed so that people in the 
original position would agree to the insurance program? Professor 
Markovits notes that there is no general answer to that question, but 
he also explains that the “maximum talent-slavery-safe level of 
insurance” will fall well below the average wage rate in a society in 
which the distribution of earnings potential has a pronounced tail at 
the high end: 
[A]s the talent distribution becomes more dispersed, and 
particularly as the median and the mode of the distribution fall 
further below the mean (as the distribution develops a tail at the 
high end), insuring even at levels below the mean will require people 
to pay a greater proportion of their maximum wage as premiums, 
premiums a smaller range of jobs will enable them to support. For 
both reasons, the maximum talent-slavery-safe level of insurance 
will in such cases fall further below the mean.51 
Performing some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on the 
1999 wage distribution in the United States (featuring an impressive 
tail at the high end), Markovits plausibly concludes that people aware 
of that wage distribution but unaware of their own wage rate “would 
 
 48. Markovits, supra note 15, at 2307–09. 
 49. Id. at 2308. 
 50. Id. at 2308–09. 
 51. Id. at 2310. 
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insure only up to talent levels that fall significantly—more than 25 
percent—below the mean.”52 
Endowment taxation and talent slavery are not the central 
themes of Professor Markovits’s article (and perhaps for that reason 
his article has previously gone unnoticed by endowment tax 
commentators). Rather, he uses his discussion of endowment taxation 
to support his major thesis, which is that the two goals of many liberal 
egalitarians—elimination of inequalities due to brute luck, while 
respecting differences resulting from different people having made 
different choices—are logically incompatible. The significance of 
endowment taxation to Markovits’s thesis is that endowment taxation 
can eliminate brute luck only under a full insurance scheme that 
people would reject if given the choice. Thus one must either 
abandon the goal of eliminating inequality of brute luck in order to 
respect choice, or abandon the goal of respecting choice in order to 
eliminate inequality of brute luck.53 Quite apart from Markovits’s 
thesis, however, his analysis has important implications for the 
ongoing debate over endowment taxation and talent slavery. It 
provides an attractive account of endowment taxation as wage rate 
insurance, and situates the talent slavery concern as a constraint in 
the design of the endowment tax system, rather than as an argument 
against endowment taxation in any form. 
C. Refining the Definition of Endowment 
The talent slavery objection is aimed at an endowment tax which 
defines endowment as one’s maximum wage rate multiplied by the 
maximum number of hours one could work, without regard to the 
utility or disutility associated with that level of work effort. There are 
two possible refinements of the concept of endowment, however, 
each of which arguably does a better job of measuring real differences 
in brute luck than the simple notion of potential earnings. Each of 
these refinements can be defended as being preferable to potential 
earnings as an ideal tax base, and each has the additional benefit of 
ameliorating the talent slavery problem. 
 
 52. Id. at 2313. 
 53. Id. at 2323. 
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1. The Musgrave Proposal.  The first refinement has been 
offered by Richard Musgrave.54 According to Professor Musgrave, an 
ideal tax-and-transfer system would redistribute not with respect to 
potential income, but with respect to potential welfare.55 He illustrates 
his point with an example involving two persons with different wage 
rates, who are identical in all other respects. The welfare of each 
person is a function of his hours of leisure and his consumption of 
goods. The two persons have identical utility functions, so each will 
enjoy the same level of welfare as the other from any given 
combination of hours of leisure and dollars of consumption. In the 
absence of a tax-and-transfer system, the person with the higher wage 
rate (H) will have a higher level of welfare, as he can select a 
combination of leisure and consumption that will place him on an 
indifference curve higher than any indifference curve reachable by 
the person with the lower wage rate (L).56 Under the standard view of 
endowment taxation, complete elimination of the brute luck 
difference in their wage rates would require a transfer from H to L 
sufficient to give the two persons equal net-of-transfer potential 
consumption.57 For example, if H’s hourly wage is $60, L’s is $10, and 
there are 4,000 potential work hours in a year, the required transfer 
would be $100,000.58 Although this will equalize the potential 
consumptions of H and L, it will leave L with a higher level of welfare 
than H. Suppose, for example, that faced with the $100,000 tax-and-
transfer program, H decided to work 3,333 hours (generating 
$200,000 of pretax income) and L decided not to work at all. Each 
would have $100,000 available for consumption after the transfer of 
$100,000 from H to L, but L would have 4,000 hours of leisure while 
H had only 667 hours.59 
 
 54. Richard Musgrave, Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off, 88 Q.J. ECON. 
625 (1974). 
 55. Id. at 630 & nn.10–11. 
 56. An indifference curve indicates all the combinations of leisure and consumption which 
would produce the same level of utility for a person. Thus, a person would be indifferent as to 
the choice among leisure-consumption combinations located on the same indifference curve. 
 57. This is, of course, the sort of tax which Professor Markovits concludes would never be 
agreed to by persons in the original position. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 58. H’s net-of-transfer potential wage would then be (4000 x $60) - $100,000 = $140,000, 
and L’s net-of-transfer potential wage would then be (4000 x $10) + $100,000 = $140,000. 
 59. This is closely related to James Mirrlees’s observation that a utility-maximizing tax on 
potential earnings will leave the more talented with lower utility than the less talented. See 
Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 201 (“It is worth noticing that . . . with the particular welfare function 
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Quite apart from the question of whether H is a victim of talent 
slavery, a tax-and-transfer program which systematically leaves more 
talented persons with lower welfare than less talented persons seems 
inconsonant with liberal egalitarian conceptions of justice. 
Accordingly, Professor Musgrave’s ideal system would require a 
smaller transfer from H to L, designed not to equalize their potential 
incomes, but instead to equalize their welfares by putting them at 
different points on the same indifference curve. Musgrave describes 
this approach as “a tax on income and leisure, imposed at the proper 
rate by an omniscient referee.”60 Suppose, for example, that both H 
and L (who by hypothesis have identical utility functions) would be 
indifferent between having $140,000 of consumption and 1,000 hours 
of leisure, or having $40,000 of consumption and 4,000 hours of 
leisure. If H responds to a $40,000 lump sum tax by working 3,000 
hours and L responds to a $40,000 transfer by not working at all, then 
H will have a package of $140,000 consumption ($180,000 wages 
minus $40,000 tax) and 1,000 hours of leisure, and L will have a 
package of $40,000 consumption and 4,000 hours of leisure. Although 
H has more consumption and L has more leisure, the two are equally 
well-off, and the goal of eliminating welfare differences attributable 
to brute luck has been achieved. And it has been done by a transfer of 
only $40,000, compared with the $100,000 transfer that would have 
been required to equalize their potential incomes. As Musgrave 
explains, “The taxpayer’s [H’s] loss of leisure due to more work 
reduces his welfare just as the transfer recipient’s [L’s] gain of leisure 
raises it, thus narrowing the remaining need for income transfer.”61 
Although Professor Musgrave makes a strong argument that 
welfare is a more appropriate object of redistribution than potential 
income as a matter of first principles, he also claims that basing the 
tax on welfare has the attraction of neatly sidestepping the talent 
slavery problem raised by taxation of earnings potential: 
While the high-ability person gives up both goods and leisure, this is 
merely the outcome of his free choice between them, made in 
response to the lump sum tax. . . . The prior concern for leisure, it 
 
specified . . . utility will be less for more highly skilled individuals.”), discussed supra in text 
accompanying note 28. 
 60. Musgrave, supra note 54, at 631 n.11. 
 61. Id. at 632. 
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appears, is not needed in the context of a just solution, although it is 
appropriate if relative positions are viewed in terms of goods only.62 
To put Professor Musgrave’s point in Professor Markovits’s terms, 
persons in the original position would not view with abhorrence the 
possibility of turning out to be a high-ability person under Musgrave’s 
welfare tax. Since the tax is designed to leave high-ability persons 
with as high a level of welfare as anyone else, the result cannot be 
reasonably viewed as talent slavery. 
As presented by Professor Musgrave, his approach assumes (as 
in the illustration) that people are identical in all respects except wage 
rates. Differences in individuals’ utility functions—including 
differences in the utility derived from any given dollar amount of 
consumption and differences in the disutility associated with work—
presumably would be ignored in the construction of a Musgrave-
inspired tax system. (This would seem to be a necessity, if the system 
is to be merely extremely difficult to administer, rather than 
absolutely impossible.) The reliance on a single standardized utility 
function means the Musgrave approach would not really equalize 
welfare. If the disregarding of individualized utility information were 
combined with lumpy labor supply, it is also possible that talent 
slavery problems would remain under the Musgrave approach, 
despite Musgrave’s claim to the contrary. In the illustration above, for 
example, things work out neatly only because H has the option of 
working 3,000 hours at $60 per hour. If the only way H can earn $60 
per hour is by working 4,000 hours at a job he hates, and if his 
alternative wage rate with fewer hours worked is much lower, the 
problem of talent slavery has not been eliminated. It remains true, 
however, that talent slavery concerns would be much diminished in a 
Musgrave-inspired tax-and-transfer system, compared with the 
problems under a tax based simply on potential earnings. 
2. Factoring in the Disutility of Labor Effort.  The above 
discussion suggests that the definition of endowment as potential 
earnings is deficient because it disregards the significance of hours of 
leisure to overall welfare. It can also be argued that the definition of 
endowment as potential earnings is deficient because it disregards the 
utility or disutility people experience from work. Consider a person 
who could earn a high wage, but chooses instead to work at a 
 
 62. Id. 
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different job for a much lower wage. Such persons are objects of great 
solicitude for opponents of endowment taxation.63 But why would a 
person who could work at a higher wage decide to work at a lower 
wage (assuming the time demands of the two jobs are the same, so 
there is no question of more or fewer hours of leisure)? It must be 
because of differences in the utility (negative or positive) associated 
with supplying his labor in the two situations. One possibility is that 
he hates the high wage job, while he neither likes nor dislikes the low 
wage job. If the disutility associated with the high wage job causes 
him to take the low wage job, then his welfare if he took the high 
wage job would be no higher (and would probably be lower) than the 
welfare he experiences with the low wage job. If endowment is 
defined not narrowly as potential earnings, but more broadly as 
potential earnings plus or minus the utility or disutility associated 
with the work necessary to generate those earnings, then this person’s 
true endowment is properly measured by his actual low wages. His 
actual low wages plus zero labor utility from the low wage job must 
equal or exceed his potential high wages minus the labor disutility 
from the high wage job. Under this concept of net endowment, an 
income tax would produce for this person the same result as a tax on 
his net endowment, whereas a tax on potential earnings would tax 
him on more than his net endowment. 
If all persons who turned their backs on high wage jobs did so 
because they hated those jobs, and if a tax system were based on this 
concept of net endowment, the problem of talent slavery would be 
solved, as net endowment could never be higher than wages actually 
earned. A person who would not do high wage work because he 
hated it would be treated just like someone who could not do high 
wage work because he lacked the skill. As a solution to the talent 
slavery problem this amounts to killing the endowment tax in order to 
save it, since the best way of implementing this vision of an 
endowment tax would be with a traditional income tax. 
Although this position—that an income tax is actually a good 
approximation of an endowment tax, if endowment is defined to take 
into account labor disutility—has considerable appeal, it is subject to 
two objections. First, a distaste for high wage work can be viewed as a 
kind of expensive taste (because the alternative uses of one’s time are 
 
 63. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123 (considering the example of a 
potential sculptor who must work as a corporate lawyer to pay his taxes under an endowment 
tax). 
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expensive in terms of foregone income), and there is a prominent 
liberal egalitarian argument, associated primarily with Ronald 
Dworkin, that distributive justice should make no allowance for 
expensive tastes. Working from a model of tax-and-transfer systems 
as insurance against bad brute luck, Professor Dworkin concludes 
that insurance against expensive tastes is inappropriate, because one’s 
tastes are an integral part of one’s personhood.64 As there is no reason 
to suppose people would want to insure against being other than who 
they are, there is no reason to suppose people would want to insure 
against having different tastes than they actually have. This view has 
been convincingly refuted, however, by Daniel Markovits. He 
suggests that a person in the original position, who knows his tastes 
but not whether they are expensive, might well want “insurance not 
against having the taste, but rather against turning out to live in a 
world in which it is expensive.”65 By the same token, a person who 
hates a particular job might want to insure against the possibility that 
the hated job pays a high wage and thus would generate a huge tax 
bill under a tax system based on potential earnings. The simplest way 
of providing such insurance might be simply to abandon the taxation 
of potential earnings in favor of taxing only actual earnings. 
The second objection to the idea of an income tax as the best 
embodiment of a net endowment tax is less easily answered. In the 
preceding illustration, the income tax works well as a net endowment 
tax only because the example assumes the person turns down the high 
wage job because he hates it, rather than because he loves the low 
wage job. Suppose instead that the person neither likes nor dislikes 
the high wage job, loves the low wage job, and decides to take the low 
wage job. If so, taxing him on the potential earnings from the high 
wage job may be appropriate, since his utility from his current 
situation is as high as the utility associated with his potential earnings. 
In the previous example, his net endowment was no greater than his 
actual wages from the low wage job, but in this example his net 
endowment is at least as great as the potential wages from the high 
wage job. Even if the effect of a tax on potential wages were to force 
him to take the high wage job, it would be hard to view that as talent 
slavery if he does not dislike the high wage job. 
 
 64. Dworkin, supra note 29, at 303. 
 65. Markovits, supra note 15, at 2315. 
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Although this second objection has force, it may not be powerful 
enough to rehabilitate taxation of potential wages. If one’s ideal tax 
base would be net endowment (i.e., potential wages plus labor utility 
or minus labor disutility), but for the inability to measure labor utility 
or disutility, then the available second best choices are an income tax 
or a tax on potential earnings. The choice, then, would be based on 
(1) which tax would produce more errors, (2) the magnitudes of the 
errors produced by each tax, and (3) whether the type of errors 
produced under one tax is worse than the type of errors produced 
under the other. The income tax produces errors when a person 
chooses low wage work because he loves it, whereas the tax on 
potential earnings produces errors when a person avoids high wage 
work because he hates it. My suspicion is that hatred of high wage 
work is more common than love of low wage work, in which case the 
income tax would produce fewer errors. Even if empirical 
investigation proved that suspicion wrong, one might still favor the 
income tax on the basis that the errors produced by a tax on potential 
earnings result in talent slavery, whereas the more numerous errors 
produced by the income tax would have less dire consequences. In 
sum, if redistribution would ideally be done with respect to net 
endowment—defined as potential wages adjusted for the utility or 
disutility of work—it is difficult to conclude that a tax on potential 
wages is superior to an income tax in its approximation of the ideal.66 
 
 66. The discussion in the text only scratches the surface of the possible relationships 
between potential wages and the utility or disutility of work. As a more elaborate example, 
consider the following three persons, all of whom work the same number of hours: 
A works at a high wage job (HWJ) which he neither likes nor dislikes. 
B could work at the same HWJ as A, which he would neither like nor dislike, but works 
instead at a low wage job (LWJ), which he loves. 
C does not have the skills for HWJ, so he works at the same LWJ as B, which he loves as 
much as B loves his LWJ. 
If the ideal tax base is net endowment (i.e., potential wages plus work utility or minus work 
disutility), then B has a net endowment at least as high as A, and C has the same net endowment 
as B. As the discussion in the text indicates, a net endowment tax could reasonably tax B on his 
high potential wages, even if it meant B had to move from the low wage job to the high wage 
job. The problem for the net endowment tax is C, who is just as well off in net endowment terms 
as B (same wages and same utility from work), but who unlike B does not have the ability to 
cash out his love of his job by moving to a high wage job. A comprehensive tax on net 
endowment may not be possible, then, if it would impose a higher tax burden on C than he 
could possible pay in cash. The response to this problem might be to revise the concept of net 
endowment, so that one’s utility should be included in the tax base only to the extent one could 
convert it to cash. The tax would then be neither a pure tax on utility nor a pure tax on potential 
earnings, but a hybrid of the two. 
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So far the discussion in this section has abstracted from Professor 
Musgrave’s concern about differences in hours of leisure, by assuming 
that persons differ in their earnings and in their love or hate of their 
work, but not in the division of their time between work and leisure. 
A comprehensive concept of endowment, however, might include 
both a Musgravean consideration of leisure and a consideration of 
differences in the utility or disutility of work. Designing a tax system 
reflective of that concept of endowment would be a daunting task, but 
a point made by Louis Kaplow is worth noting in this regard. 
Professor Kaplow has demonstrated that if two persons with different 
wage rates nevertheless have the same earned income, because the 
person with the higher wage rate experiences greater labor disutility 
and so works fewer hours, then the two persons will also have the 
same total utility (assuming they are identical in all other respects).67 
Compared with the lower wage person, the greater utility the higher 
wage person derives from more leisure is precisely offset by the 
greater disutility he suffers from working. The two persons are 
equally well-off under a comprehensive definition of endowment 
(reflecting their available packages of consumption, labor utility or 
disutility, and leisure), and a simple income tax on their identical 
incomes would appropriately subject them to equal tax burdens. It 
does not follow that an income tax always magically replicates the 
results that would be achieved by a tax based on a broad concept of 
endowment,68 but one could do worse than an income tax from this 
perspective. 
D. Endowment Taxation as “Distinctly Illiberal”:  
The Hasen Objection 
The standard objection of liberal egalitarians to endowment 
taxation (in the usual sense of a tax on earnings potential) is that it 
will result in talent slavery. David Hasen, however, has recently 
lodged a more fundamental objection.69 According to Professor 
Hasen, endowment taxation should be unacceptable to liberal 
egalitarians, quite apart from any risk of talent slavery. As is common 
 
 67. Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics ch. 5, at 17–18 (2006) 
(unpublished preliminary draft, on file with author). 
 68. For example, consider individuals A and B in the illustration in note 66. Under a 
comprehensive definition of endowment, B’s endowment is at least as great as A’s, but B’s 
income tax liability would be much less than A’s. 
 69. Hasen, supra note 14. 
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in liberal egalitarian accounts of distributive justice, Hasen asks what 
sort of social contract people might agree to from “a ‘pre-
governmental’ bargaining situation.”70 He believes that the social 
contract would reflect a strong concern for “autonomy, understood as 
the right to posit and realize one’s own ends with minimal 
interference from others.”71 People in the original position would 
agree to constraints on their autonomy only to the extent those 
constraints were needed in order to make possible the benefits of 
social cooperation. Under this view, “the point of taxation is to 
allocate the costs of producing benefits that membership in a system 
of social cooperation confers,”72 and the natural tax base is therefore 
the benefits of social cooperation. Because earned income is the 
result of social cooperation but potential earnings are not, actual 
income is an appropriate tax base but potential income is not: 
[I]t is the specific nature of income—that it is produced through 
cooperation—that confers the right to tax it in the first place. It is 
the production of actual, not possible, income that political society 
facilitates and for which the participants must pay; the system does 
not . . . produce income-earning capacity.73 
If interference with autonomy is justified only to the extent necessary 
to facilitate social cooperation, and if unexploited earnings capacity is 
not produced through social cooperation, it follows that “the value of 
autonomy largely rules out endowment taxation.”74 This goes far 
beyond a concern about possible talent slavery: “[I]n order to make 
endowment taxation legitimate within a liberal framework, one would 
need to locate some additional constitutive principle that could 
support it, because autonomy as an organizing principle leaves 
essentially no room for it.”75 
 
 70. Id. at 13. 
 71. Id. at 15. 
 72. Id. at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 17. Mark Kelman appears to have taken essentially the same position, in a much 
less fully-developed form, a quarter century earlier. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions 
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from 
Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 842 n.33 (1979). 
 75. Hasen, supra note 14, at 19. Professor Hasen does not discuss the possibility of an 
ultimate exit option under an endowment tax—i.e., that a person who did not want to be taxed 
on his unused earnings potential could escape the tax by leaving the country, or perhaps by 
remaining in the country but living on his own in the wilderness. Presumably he would consider 
the protection of autonomy afforded by an exit option to be insufficient. 
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Professor Hasen’s claim is subject to three quibbles, and to one 
major objection. The first quibble, which Hasen notes himself, is that 
even people who choose to earn little or no income—such as the oft-
invoked beachcomber—may benefit from social cooperation to the 
extent they are protected by the police and fire departments, and by 
national defense. Hasen concedes that endowment taxation “might be 
perfectly appropriate” as to those benefits.76 Second, Hasen does not 
consider the possibility that unused earnings capacity might be a 
measure of noncash benefits of cooperation. If a law professor could 
have earned much more as a corporate lawyer, but chooses a teaching 
career because of its intangible joys, those joys are benefits of social 
cooperation, and they could be reached through a tax on potential 
earnings. Third, Hasen does not acknowledge the autonomy case for 
an endowment tax rather than an income tax. The substitution effect 
of an income tax pushes taxpayers away from earning income and 
toward nontaxed uses of their time. If a proper respect for autonomy 
requires the government to be as nearly neutral as possible among 
different ends, conceptions of the good, and uses of time, it is not 
clear that an income tax is preferable to an endowment tax. True, the 
requirement that an endowment tax be paid in cash may push people 
into the workforce (in the extreme case resulting in talent slavery), 
but because one’s endowment tax does not depend on how one 
spends one’s time, the endowment tax avoids the favoritism for 
leisure (and for low-wage, high-pleasure employment) inherent in an 
income tax. 
The major objection, however, is that Professor Hasen’s 
argument depends on a constricted view of what qualifies as liberal 
egalitarian thought. His account of distributive justice and the social 
contract is a plausible one, and he is right that endowment taxation 
would be ruled out under that account. But could not one imagine a 
different version of the social contract, under which people in the 
original position would agree to endowment taxation? Hasen asks 
this question himself: “Why can’t or wouldn’t the parties to the 
original bargaining position agree to make some or all of their 
endowments the subject of their agreement [and thus subject to 
tax]?”77 He answers, “[W]hile such an approach is possible, it is also 
distinctly illiberal.”78 It is illiberal because by “compel[ling] more than 
 
 76. Id. at 30 n.94. 
 77. Id. at 27. 
 78. Id. 
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a minimal amount of social cooperation” it does not sufficiently 
respect autonomy.79 Despite Hasen’s claim that his argument applies 
with respect to “liberal political theories in general,”80 across a wide 
range of liberal egalitarian thought, his conclusion follows only under 
a narrow view of what constitutes liberal egalitarianism. Certainly a 
number of other thinkers, liberal egalitarians by self-identification 
and by common understanding—including Ronald Dworkin, Daniel 
Markovits, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel—have found 
endowment taxation compatible with liberal egalitarianism, apart 
from talent slavery concerns.81 The appeal is based on the idea, 
pioneered by Professor Dworkin and developed by Professor 
Markovits, that people in the original position might favor 
endowment taxation as low-endowment insurance, at least if it could 
be done without talent slavery.82 This follows from the value liberal 
egalitarians place on ameliorating differences among individuals 
attributable to brute luck. Although that value must be weighed 
against the interference with autonomy caused by endowment 
taxation, it is not clear why anyone who thinks the insurance positives 
of endowment taxation (limited as necessary to avoid talent slavery) 
outweigh the autonomy negatives should be declared a heretic and 
excommunicated from the liberal egalitarian church.83 Unless one is 
willing to deny the liberal egalitarian credentials of the likes of 
Dworkin, Markovits, Murphy, and Nagel, Hasen’s argument is only a 
liberal egalitarian case against endowment taxation, not the liberal 
egalitarian case. 
III.  SLOUCHING TOWARD ENDOWMENT TAXATION 
Despite David Hasen’s claim to the contrary, a liberal egalitarian 
might reasonably conclude that redistribution from those with better 
luck in the natural lottery to those with worse luck is normatively 
attractive. Such a liberal egalitarian would support something along 
 
 79. Id. at 28. 
 80. Id. at 30. 
 81. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 121–25; Dworkin, supra note 29, at 311–12; 
Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13. 
 82. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
 83. According to Professor Hasen, autonomy is a “constitutive” principle of liberal 
egalitarianism, rather than a mere “regulative” principle, with the result that it cannot be 
balanced against other values. Hasen, supra note 14, at 17–19. Apparently, anyone who 
disagrees with Hasen on this point is not, in Hasen’s view, a true liberal egalitarian. 
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the lines of an endowment tax, although he would insist that it be 
designed to avoid talent slavery and he might believe that mere 
earnings capacity (not taking into account, for example, differences in 
labor disutility) is inadequate as a measure of a person’s net brute 
luck. Thus Daniel Shaviro has suggested that liberal egalitarians 
should employ endowment as an “orienting idea” in thinking about 
tax-and-transfer policy, and that “[t]he idea [of endowment taxation] 
deserves greater prominence and acceptance, even though we will 
never see, and probably do not want to see, a literal, direct 
endowment tax.”84 
The question then becomes to what extent it might be both 
practical and desirable to take steps in the direction of endowment 
taxation, without adopting a full-fledged endowment tax. One 
possibility has already been mentioned—Louis Kaplow’s suggestion 
that the talent slavery problem could be solved by a tax on potential 
earnings, subject to the limitation that a person’s tax liability shall 
never exceed 90 percent of his actual earnings.85 Kaplow does not 
actually endorse this idea, and it is obviously a political nonstarter. In 
addition to the formidable administrative difficulties involved in 
determining each person’s maximum wage rate, even with the ceiling 
the tax would be opposed by many as unduly burdensome to those 
who fail to realize their maximum earning potential because doing so 
would require them to work at jobs they would hate.86 
There may, however, be smaller steps in the endowment tax 
direction which are not subject to such serious objections. A 
thoughtful discussion of practical ideas for partial implementation of 
endowment tax principles appears in a recent article by Kyle Logue 
and Ronen Avraham.87 The significance of the article to the 
endowment tax debate is somewhat obscured by the fact that the 
article is framed not as a contribution to the endowment tax literature 
but as a contribution to the literature on the appropriate use of 
taxation vis-à-vis nontax legal rules. The article is a response to the 
claim of some law and economics scholars—most notably Louis 
 
 84. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 125, 144. 
 85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 86. Conversely, endowment tax purists—if any exist—would object that the 90 percent-of-
actual-wages ceiling prevents the hybrid tax from being a close approximation of a true 
endowment tax, for those who earn far below their potential. See supra text accompanying note 
44. 
 87. Logue & Avraham, supra note 15. 
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Kaplow and Steven Shavell—that redistribution should be 
accomplished solely through the tax-and-transfer system, rather than 
also through nontax legal rules.88 The article’s thesis is that many 
differences in brute luck are not captured by differences in income-
producing capacities, that a liberal society may desire to redistribute 
with respect to some of these non-income-related inequalities, and 
that legal rules will sometimes have important advantages over tax 
rules in accomplishing such redistribution.89 
Their most compelling example relates to genetically-determined 
diseases.90 If we want to redistribute from those without disease-
related genes to victims of genetic bad luck, it would be theoretically 
possible to impose a tax directly on the good luck of not having a 
particular disease-related gene, and to transfer the resulting tax 
revenue to those with the gene. A similar result could be reached 
much more simply, however, by a nontax law prohibiting health 
insurers from discriminating against persons with the gene (either by 
refusing to offer them any coverage, or by charging them higher 
premiums). Such a nondiscrimination rule would redistribute from 
those without the disease-related gene to those with the gene, and this 
redistribution would be accomplished almost effortlessly compared 
with the alternative of (1) allowing insurers to discriminate against 
persons with disease-related genes and (2) using the tax-and-transfer 
system to offset the effects of that discrimination. The 
nondiscrimination rule approach thus has the uncanny effect of 
redistributing on the basis of a particular aspect of genetic 
endowment without the need for determining anyone’s actual genetic 
information. 
Although the fact that the insurance nondiscrimination rule is a 
nontax law is crucial in the debate between Professors Logue and 
Avraham and Professors Kaplow and Shavell, the significance of the 
Logue-Avraham analysis for endowment taxation lies elsewhere. As 
Logue and Avraham themselves point out, “at the margins, these 
categories—tax rules and legal rules—begin to break down.”91 
 
 88. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
 89. Logue & Avraham, supra note 15, at 252–57. 
 90. Id. at 208–18. 
 91. Id. at 208. 
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Suppose, for example, that the United States moved to a system of 
universal government-sponsored health insurance, financed by 
taxation, and that the system was designed (on both the tax and the 
insurance sides) to avoid discrimination on the basis of disease-
related genes. This would accomplish the same redistribution as the 
nondiscrimination rule suggested by Logue and Avraham, but would 
it be redistribution by way of tax rules or by way of nontax legal 
rules? For present purposes, the answer is that it does not really 
matter. What is important is that Logue and Avraham have identified 
a situation in which the government could and arguably should 
redistribute on the basis of one (nonincome related) aspect of 
endowment; whether that redistribution is better accomplished 
through tax or nontax means is a lower order question. In any event, 
if the redistribution occurs in the context of a government-sponsored 
insurance program financed by taxation, it will be accomplished 
through the tax system. In fact, something like this is already being 
done. Medicare is a massive tax-and-transfer system, which 
redistributes from healthy participants to sick participants (in 
addition to redistributing along a number of other dimensions). To 
the considerable extent that good or bad health among the elderly is a 
matter of brute luck rather than lifestyle choices, Medicare 
redistributes on the basis of one aspect of endowment.92 Similarly, one 
of the dimensions along which Social Security redistributes is 
longevity; the system benefits long-lived recipients at the expense of 
the short-lived. Longevity can be viewed in this context, somewhat 
counterintuitively, as a negative aspect of endowment (because of the 
costs associated with it), against which people in the original position 
might want to insure through a government-sponsored annuity 
program. Under this view, Social Security constitutes another form of 
existing redistribution on the basis of a particular component of 
endowment, accomplished through a tax-and-transfer program.93 
Does this sort of partial endowment taxation make sense? Is it 
justifiable to redistribute on the basis of one or more selected 
components of endowment in isolation, without regard to the total 
endowment of the persons involved in the redistribution? Would it be 
fair, for example, for a billionaire with a disease-related gene to 
benefit from the limited endowment tax inherent in a health 
 
 92. Professors Logue and Avraham briefly note this point. Id. at 226–27. 
 93. Id. at 227 n.211 (describing Social Security as “produc[ing] transfers from the short-
lived to the long-lived”). 
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insurance nondiscrimination mandate? Professors Logue and 
Avraham argue that it would be fair, for two reasons. The first reason 
they label the “independence assumption.”94 The idea is that some 
types of inequality of brute luck may be appropriate subjects for 
redistribution, without regard to the overall distribution of brute luck. 
Thus, redistribution within the health insurance system to those with 
disease-related genes is justified, even to persons who happen to be 
rich, if we believe that the genetic “source of inequality is 
problematic, not as a proxy for well-being, but in and of itself.”95 Even 
if the independence assumption is rejected, however, Logue and 
Avraham claim it would still make sense to use different 
redistributive tools to redistribute with respect to different 
components of overall endowment, with each tool aimed at the 
component “for which that instrument has a comparative advantage 
at either observing [the component of endowment] or redistributing 
[with respect to that component] or both.”96 Thus, although a single 
tax on a comprehensive definition of endowment (i.e., net brute luck) 
is impossible, the closest practical approximation of that ideal might 
include, among other things, (1) an income tax as a very imperfect 
means of redistributing with respect to earnings capacity, (2) health 
insurance subject to a nondiscrimination mandate as redistribution 
with respect to the presence or absence of disease-related genes, and 
(3) Social Security as redistribution with respect to longevity luck. 
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott have proposed slouching 
toward endowment taxation from a different direction.97 They would 
replace Social Security retirement benefits based on earnings histories 
with “citizen’s pensions” payable in equal amounts to all elderly 
citizens.98 They would finance these pensions not with payroll taxes, 
but with a new “privilege tax.” Each person would be required to pay 
the privilege tax annually, from the age of twenty-one to the age of 
sixty-seven,99 with the size of the annual tax bill depending on one’s 
parents’ income during one’s childhood.100 The tax would identify 
 
 94. Id. at 245. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 246. 
 97. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 155–77 
(1999) (proposing a “privilege tax” to finance the Stakeholder Society). 
 98. Id. at 129–54. 
 99. Id. at 168–69. 
 100. Id. at 166–67. 
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three levels of privilege: taxpayers with parents in the top 20 percent 
of the income distribution would pay the highest tax (Ackerman and 
Alstott suggest $3,800 per year), taxpayers with parents in the middle 
60 percent of the income distribution would pay a lower tax (they 
suggest $2,090 per year), and taxpayers with parents in the bottom 20 
percent of the income distribution would pay the lowest tax (they 
suggest $380 per year).101 
Professors Ackerman and Alstott explicitly deny that their 
proposal constitutes an endowment tax, for two reasons. First, they 
claim that their proposal is narrower than an endowment tax, because 
it focuses on a single aspect of endowment—economic privilege 
during childhood (what they call “social privilege”)—while 
disregarding all other differences (including genetic endowment and 
in-kind parental care and attention).102 But this merely means that 
their proposal is—in the spirit of Professors Logue and Avraham—
for a partial endowment tax, rather than a comprehensive endowment 
tax. This limited form of endowment tax has two significant 
attractions. First, social privilege (as defined by Ackerman and 
Alstott), unlike genetic endowment and parental care and attention, 
is susceptible to reasonably accurate measurement. Second, many 
persons who believe that society has no valid claim on the benefits of 
a person’s genetic endowment (which society arguably had no role in 
creating) may concede that society has a legitimate claim on the 
benefits of economic privilege during childhood (privilege which 
could not have existed in the absence of the state). 
The second distinction offered by Professors Ackerman and 
Alstott between their proposal and an endowment tax cuts in the 
opposite direction: they claim their proposal is broader than an 
endowment tax because an endowment tax is concerned only with 
earning power, whereas the privilege tax is aimed at the “intangible 
social and psychological advantages” conferred by childhood social 
privilege, in addition to “market advantages.”103 Although this does 
make the privilege tax different from an endowment tax as usually 
defined, in fact it moves their proposal closer to a comprehensive 
definition of endowment as net brute luck. 
 
 101. Id. at 159, 166–68. 
 102. Id. at 259 n.10. 
 103. Id. 
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Professors Ackerman and Alstott have an interesting answer to 
the anticipated talent slavery objection—or, in their words, the 
concern that the privilege tax “interferes with the liberty of privileged 
children to pursue low-paying careers.”104 According to them, this 
objection “gets the point precisely backward: the obligation to 
contribute to society in accordance with privilege is prior to one’s 
liberty to choose careers.”105 Although not all readers will be satisfied 
with this easy dismissal of the talent slavery concern, their response is 
plausible in the context of their proposed privilege tax, whereas the 
same response would clearly be inadequate in the context of a 
proposed full-fledged tax on potential earnings. The priority of the 
tax obligation over free choice of career is defensible because of two 
design features of the privilege tax. First, the low maximum amount 
of annual tax (less than $4,000) means even a would-be full-time 
beachcomber would have to work only a modest number of hours, 
with a wide range of occupational choices, in order to pay the tax. 
Second, it is more plausible to place the obligation to pay for one’s 
social privilege (measured in dollars of parental income) ahead of 
one’s ability to choose a career, than it is to give the same priority to 
an obligation to pay for one’s genetic endowment; this is because 
society played a greater role in the creation of one’s social privilege 
than it played in the creation of one’s genetic endowment. 
None of this is to say that the privilege tax is necessarily a good 
idea. For a tax proposed as a progressive replacement for “the 
regressive payroll-tax categories”106 currently used to finance Social 
Security benefits, the tax is strangely regressive. If childhood privilege 
is appropriately measured by parental income during childhood, a tax 
that takes from the children of Bill and Melinda Gates less than twice 
the amount it takes from the children of median wage parents, and 
only ten times what it takes from the children of the poorest parents, 
is highly regressive with respect to privilege. In fact, the privilege tax 
appears to be distributionally quite similar to the regressive payroll 
tax it would replace. Whether or not one favors the privilege tax, 
however, the major point for present purposes is that the privilege tax 
is another example of how we might slouch toward an endowment tax 
in ways that avoid many or all of the theoretical and practical 
objections associated with a full-fledged endowment tax. 
 
 104. Id. at 264 n.52. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 169. 
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The taxation of “indicator goods” as a supplement to a tax on 
labor income can also be understood as slouching toward endowment 
taxation. This concept, which comes from the economics literature, 
has been introduced to the legal literature in a recent article by 
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach.107 An indicator good is one 
which is consumed differentially by persons of different ability levels, 
even when those persons have the same earned income.108 Suppose, 
for example, that high culture (such as Shakespeare and opera) is an 
indicator good positively associated with ability, while cigarettes are 
indicator goods negatively associated with ability. In that case, a 
person with $100,000 of earned income who subscribes to the opera 
and does not smoke probably has higher innate ability than a person 
who earns $100,000, smokes, and hates opera. If the income tax were 
supplemented by taxes on indicator goods associated with high ability 
and subsidies for indicator goods associated with low ability, that 
would be a move in the direction of endowment taxation.109 
Emmanuel Saez has suggested, rather provocatively, that savings is an 
indicator good (i.e., at any given level of labor income, persons of 
higher ability will typically save more than persons of lower ability), 
and that the taxation of investment income under an income tax can 
thus be viewed as a move toward endowment taxation, relative to a 
tax on only labor income.110 
Once one begins to think in terms of partial endowment taxation, 
one may see various aspects of current law as unacknowledged forms 
of limited endowment taxation. Under Professor Saez’s analysis, all 
taxation of investment income may be so understood. A view of 
Medicare and Social Security as partial endowment taxation has been 
noted earlier.111 Another example, on a small scale, is the additional 
standard deduction for the blind in the federal income tax.112 Or 
consider the rule, common to the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) programs of many states, that a person must 
 
 107. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax 
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1453–55 (2006). 
 108. Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions 
on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372, 375 (1982). 
 109. From this perspective, the current practice of taxing cigarettes and subsidizing opera 
seems to be precisely backwards. 
 110. Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income 
Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217, 227–28 (2002). 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 112. I.R.C. § 63(c)(3) (2000). 
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comply with specified work requirements as a condition of receiving 
cash benefits, unless one is disabled.113 From one perspective—
admittedly not the usual one—this resembles an endowment tax on 
the ability to earn a low wage, rather than no wage at all. If two 
persons who do not work apply for TANF benefits, and the disabled 
applicant receives benefits while the able-bodied applicant does not, 
the denial of benefits to the able-bodied applicant is the equivalent of 
a tax on her ability to earn a wage. 
One may also imagine approaches to partial endowment taxation 
not embodied in current law. Consider, as an alternative to the 
privilege tax of Professors Ackerman and Alstott, a similarly tiered 
tax, similarly imposed on working-age adults, but based on Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores achieved during high school rather than 
on parental income. The necessary information would be simpler for 
the taxing authorities to obtain than eighteen years’ worth of parental 
income, and, given the relatively low level of tax burdens 
contemplated by Ackerman and Alstott and the importance attached 
to SAT scores in the college admissions process, nobody is likely to 
take a dive on the SAT as a tax avoidance strategy.114 In addition, if 
SAT scores depend on some combination of social privilege and 
genetic endowment, a tax based on SAT scores might come closer to 
a tax on overall endowment than a tax based on social privilege alone. 
On the other hand, as noted above, the failure of the privilege tax to 
reach genetic endowment is arguably an attraction of the privilege 
tax, which would be lost if it were replaced by an SAT tax. The 
privilege tax might also be superior to the SAT tax in that its reach 
seems limited to aspects of true brute luck, whereas the SAT tax 
would be based on some combination of brute luck and effort. 
Finally, a very different sort of slouching toward endowment 
taxation is suggested by Mickey Kaus’s contention that government 
should seek to produce “social equality,” rather than “money 
equality,” and that requiring a year of government service from every 
eighteen-year-old would promote that goal by “mix[ing] the classes in 
 
 113. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.3(b)(3)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 114. James Mirrlees has suggested, rather casually, that a tax based on I.Q. scores might be 
attractive for a similar reason. High I.Q. scores “may be sought after so much for prestige that 
they would not often be misrepresented.” Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 208. Because the practical 
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United States today, an SAT tax would be preferable to an I.Q. tax. 
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a common endeavor.”115 Kaus does not describe his proposal in terms 
of endowment taxation, but it can be viewed as an in-kind 
endowment tax. Although it resembles a head tax in that it requires 
an equal number of hours from each person to which it applies, it 
obviously takes larger amounts of potential earnings from those with 
higher wage rates. Thus, it can reasonably be understood as a 
proportionate endowment tax (e.g., taking 2.5 percent of each 
person’s lifetime earnings potential, on the assumption that each 
person has forty working years).116 
CONCLUSION 
Redistribution in favor of those with bad brute luck is attractive 
on both utilitarian and liberal egalitarian grounds. This has caused 
some to conclude that an endowment tax, defined as a tax on 
potential earnings, would be an appealing—perhaps even an ideal—
tax base, if only measurement problems could be overcome and talent 
slavery could be avoided. It is somewhat surprising, however, that 
potential earnings has been so readily accepted as an adequate 
measure of brute luck or endowment, when people’s luck differs in so 
many ways not captured by the measurement of potential earnings. It 
does not follow, however, from the inadequacy of potential earnings 
as a full measure of endowment, that a stand-alone income tax is the 
best that can be done by way of redistributing with respect to 
differences in brute luck. Various steps in an endowment tax 
direction—including insurance nondiscrimination rules, taxation of 
“social privilege,” and even taxation on the basis of SAT scores—may 
be both feasible and desirable complements to income taxation. If the 
endowment tax discussion can break free of the assumption that the 
ultimate measure of endowment is potential earnings, endowment tax 
thinking may have—and may deserve to have—considerable 
influence on tax-and-transfer policy. 
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